| Nein, das kann man getrost ausschließen. |  |
Dieses IMO sehr lesenswerte Intervier hier zielt ziemlich genau auf Deine Frage ab:
[https://www.businessinsider.com/galeotti-putins-wars-how-russia-rebuilt-and-destroyed-its-military-2023-4]
Mark Galeotti ist Historiker, Experte für russische Sicherheitspolitik und Leiter des Zentrums für Europäische Sicherheit am Institut für Internationale Beziehungen in Prag.
Der Knackpunkt ist: Putin hatte nach dem zu verlustreichen Verlauf des Georgienkrieges bereits eine enorme Modernisierung des russischen Militärs bewirkt!
"The point is what, at that time, the Russian leadership realized was actually Russia was not going to face that kind of massive, existential big war. Despite the propaganda that still spread, NATO was not about to drive eastward, and if, God forbid, the Chinese ever invaded, well, frankly, the only response to that that would make any sense would be nuclear. So instead, what they thought was Russia faces a future in which it's more likely to be involved in smaller, scrappier border conflicts and power-projection missions, so it needed a smaller military but one that was more flexible, more efficient, and generally more modern."
Und die Annexion der Krim und die Einsätze in Syrien zeigten, dass die Reformen gegriffen haben - nur startete Putin dann mit dieser dafür völlig ungeeigneten Armee eine gewaltige, klassische Invasion:
"So it showed that, in fact, reform was having a real impact, but I think it also, in hindsight, demonstrated two other things. First of all was that actually reform was still focused on a relative handful of elite elements within the military. It's not as though every single Russian soldier was now at that capability. But secondly, it worked precisely because of this new expectation that Russia would not be fighting a big war, and that clearly would come back to bite it in February 2022."
Jetzt sind die ganzen modernen Waffen kaputt und die Sanktionen sorgen dafür, dass Russland sein Arsenal kaum wieder auffüllen kann:
"So I think the generals do their bests, but they haven't coped with the fact that they've lost their best equipment and their best soldiers in those early weeks and months of the war."
(...)
"Even if the war ends tomorrow, in my opinion, it would take a decade to reconstitute Russian forces to the level they were at in January last year, and that's assuming that Russia can and is willing to spend what it takes and has access to the kind of computer chips and everything else that will be needed, which are very, very questionable assumptions, quite frankly."
Sofern Russland nicht glaubhaft einen kompletten politischen Wandel vollzieht und zumindest sein internationales Ansehen Stand Januar 2022 wiederherstellen kann, glaube ich kaum, dass wir zu Lebzeiten nochmal eine russische Armee mit nennenswerter Schlagkraft erleben werden - und dann müssten wir auch keine akute Angst davor haben.
Das ist für Russland das bestmögliche Szenario. Und ich rechne eher nicht damit, dass es eintreten wird.